Intersectionality in Political Science: How Race/Ethnicity and Gender Affect Political
Preferences

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Abstract of Dissertation

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This study investigates how race/ethnicity and gender affect political preferences
using the intersectionality framework. I examine the simultaneous effect of race/ethnicity
and gender in Washington, DC's 2014 Mayoral Primary election and in national immigration
attitudes. I use Washington Post data to show that black women were more supportive
relative to black men of candidate Muriel Bowser over Mayor Vincent Gray. Ms. Bowser was
sensitive to black women's threat from marijuana decriminalization and gentrification, where
Mayor Gray was not. I use an original experimental design to explore the size of the effect of
threat on black men and black women's attitudes towards gentrification. I find that
immediate racial threat increases opposition more among black men, distant gender threat
increases opposition in black women, and combined distant racial and gender threats have a
stronger impact on opposition in black men relative to black women. And, I demonstrate
that gender modifies racial/ethnic attitudes towards immigration with multiple datasets.
These results challenge the notion that identities operate independently, an assumption
which underlies standard statistical approaches.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Political science is the study of power. It is the study of who gets what, when. In democratic systems, any of these questions revolve around public opinion. To what extent does the public get what it wants? Within that, political scientists study groups defined by characteristics such as race, ethnicity, and class. These identities affect how voters respond to political stimuli. Yet, more recent work suggests that identities do not operate independently but work together to shape unique attitudes.

This work relies on insights from the study of intersectionality (Crenshaw 1991; Simien 2004). Intersectionality is an emerging research paradigm rooted in black feminism with important implications for understanding groups in political science (Jordan-Zachary 2007; Lindsay 2013; Wadsworth 2011). Intersectionality entails examining the interconnected nature of multiple social identities and how those relationships connect to positions of privilege and oppression (Else-Quest and Hyde 2016a). This framework does not assume that race, gender, class, and other social identities operate independently but rather are interdependent. This interdependence leads to unique attitudes within and between groups.

Intersectionality challenges previous approaches to the study of identity in three ways. First, intersectionality assumes that individuals are characterized *simultaneously* by multiple social categories. Traditional analyses treat identities like race and gender as separate—for example, in the multivariate models commonly used in political behavior. I will argue, however, that traditional approaches mask important variation within racial and gender groups. For example, black men and women may agree on some political issues but differ on others.

Second, intersectionality assumes that occupying different positions in a privilege/oppression "matrix" affects individuals' perspectives (May 2015). To illustrate this,

consider female and male gender identities and black and white racial identities. For gender, male is the privileged identity and female is the disadvantaged identity. For race, white is the privileged identity, and black is the disadvantaged identity. A white male has two privileged identities. A white female has a privileged racial identity and a disadvantaged gender identity. A black male has a disadvantaged racial identity but a privileged gender identity. A black female has two disadvantaged identities. Within this matrix, black women may sometimes resemble black men, white women, or may have attitudes distinct from both groups (Collins 2000).

Third, identities are fluid and dynamic (Else-Quest and Hyde 2016b). Context helps determine which identities are salient in a given situation. Educational policy is likely to evoke different salient identities than foreign policy. The nature and the salience of identities will also change over time based on factors such as political messages, economic conditions, news coverage, and current events. A dormant identity in one time period may become highly salient in another.

Extant studies of intersectionality have examined the effects of institutions and systematic disadvantages in society (Crenshaw 1991, 1993; Jordan-Zachary 2007; Lindsay 2013; Wadsworth 2011), the descriptive and substantive representation of minority groups (Hardy-Fanta 2013; Hawkesworth 2003; Minta 2012; Mansbridge 1999; Reingold and Smith 2012; Simien 2007; Smooth 2011; Strolovich 2006; Uhlaner 2012), and the complex nature of the intersectionality paradigm itself (Dahmoon 2001; Hancock 2007, 2013). An important development in the theory of intersectionality is understanding that race and gender are deeply connected and cannot be disaggregated (Hancock 2013; Lindsay 2013).

In studies of intersectionality and political attitudes, scholars have examined on the strength of gender and race identification or consciousness (Gay and Tate 1998; Simien and

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Clawson 2004). Higher black feminist consciousness was positively correlated with support for abortion across gender, but higher racial consciousness was negatively correlated with support for abortion (Simien and Clawson 2004). But in many other policy domains, both strength of identification of feminist and racial consciousness were correlated with liberal policy preferences (Gay and Tate 1998). However, Gay and Tate did find that support for O.J. Simpson and the Million Man March were positively correlated with race identification and negatively correlated with gender identification.

Research on the gender gap shows that women have a distinct political perspective based on their gender identity (Conover 1988). This identity is fostered by a women's social and biological life experiences that help create a propensity for interpersonal relationships and "maternal thinking" (Ruddick 1980; Einenstein 1983). From this emerges an ethos of heightened compassion and caring for others (Gilligan 1982; Grimshaw 1986). I summarize this as a general orientation towards family and community.

My research question is: **under what conditions to multiple identities interact to affect political preferences?** I argue that the interaction of two identities is conditional on a threat to both identities simultaneously (the threat hypothesis). A threat to a single identity will not result in an intersectional effect. Policy proposals are threatening if they increase the risk of harassment by law enforcement, the loss of housing or community networks, access to essential services, or the continued the invisibility of an oppressed group.

Furthermore, threat also entails a temporal element. I propose a threatening public action could be implemented in the short term will be more threatening and will evoke a strong feeling of threat. A threatening public action under consideration for the distant future is not likely to evoke the same intensity (the immediacy hypothesis).

For example, the varying effects of gender and racial consciousness on attitudes toward O.J. Simpson and the Million Man March controversies in Gay and Tate (1998) may be explained by these hypotheses. These issues arguably threatened respondents' race and gender identities. Black men may have supported Simpson because he was seen as the victim of the judicial system, but black women may have felt less supportive because he was accused of murdering another woman. The Million Man March brought black men from around the country to Washington DC to generate national headlines with efforts to raise awareness of social and economic woes. Black men would be understandably supportive of this, but black women may have been less so relative to black men due to the exclusion and invisibility of issues important to women. (A smaller march for black women was held two years later.) Both issues could also be considered "immediate" in that they would be "resolved" in a short time frame—e.g., with a trial verdict or the completion of the march.

This dissertation demonstrates how an intersectional framework helps illuminate group preferences and power dynamics. I focus on combinations of race/ethnicity and gender, such as whether black/Hispanic women are statistically distinct from black/Hispanic men and white women.

In Chapter 2, I first examine voter preferences in the 2014 Washington DC Democratic primary. Washington, DC is a heavily Democratic city, and the candidate who wins the primary is likely to become the mayor. The two frontrunners were incumbent Mayor Vincent Gray and challenger Muriel Bowser—both of whom are black—and it is rare to have two black frontrunners of different genders competing in an American election. I find that black women were more supportive of Muriel Bowser relative to black men, but were less supportive of Bowser relative to white women.

I also investigate the opinions of Washington DC residents about the legalization of

marijuana, which was adopted via a referendum in 2014. I argue that black women had unique concerns that would lead them to oppose legalization at a higher rate than black men and white women. Although all blacks, and especially black men, experience higher incarceration rates for use and possession of marijuana—thus suggesting a potential benefit to legalization—media reports suggested that black women that any increased marijuana use would pose a risk to their families and communities (see also Conover 1988; Kaufmann 2006). Thus, marijuana legalization arguably threatens black women's racial and gender identities. White attitudes, by contrast, did not differ among men and women.

In Chapter 3, I examine attitudes towards gentrification. This was a major issue in the campaign because the city government was considering a proposal to demolish poor neighborhoods to construct a new professional soccer stadium along with the corresponding commercial development. Via an original experiment, I investigated whether making salient potential threats to racial and gender groups in turn made those identities more strongly associated with support for constructing the stadium. The gender threat treatment emphasized the disruption to community and social networks, while racial threat treatment discussed the disproportionate impact that gentrification has on the black community. I find that gender threat increased opposition in black women. Racial threat increased opposition in both black men and black women but had a stronger impact on black men. Combining race and gender threat increased black men's and women's opposition to the stadium, but the effect was stronger for black men.

In Chapter 4, I study immigration attitudes, particularly those of the 2010 Arizona immigration bill. The Arizona bill was widely considered to increase the likelihood of harassment of Hispanics. This makes their ethnic identity salient. I also hypothesize that, contrary to some previous literature on immigration attitudes, gender will also be salient

because this bill particularly threatened families and communities. I find that Hispanic women were consistently more supportive of liberal immigration policies, relative to Hispanic men and white women and white men. Hispanic men were more supportive of liberal immigration policies than whites. White women were more supportive of liberal immigration policies than white men.

Finally, in Chapter 5 I conclude with some thoughts about how to move forward from here. I suggest that threat is only one mechanism by which intersectional attitudes can be induced when considering race/ethnicity and gender. There are other causal mechanisms that need to be understood. I further suggest the need to move beyond the race-gender binary and explore other identities that may be salient.

In this introduction, I outlined the theory of intersectionality, which argues the interdependence of race and gender means that they cannot be treated as separate identities. I suggest that political scientists may be missing important variation in the data by not taking this interdependence into account. Political scientists may be unintentionally overlooking disadvantaged groups, such as black women, whose attitudes may be distinctly different from black men and white women.

Chapter 2: Intersectionality in 2014 Washington, DC Democratic Mayoral Primary

Very few studies have examined how vote choice is affected by the intersection of race and gender. Far more common is to study the influence of race on voting for candidates from racial minorities (Clayton and Stallings 2000; Dawson 1995; Philpot and Walton 2007) or the effect of gender on making inferences about candidates (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Kahn 1994; Matland 1994; Sanbonmatsu 2002) or voting for candidates of different genders (Rosenthal 1995; Sanbonmatsu 2002). Gender-based inferences may depend on whether the issues emphasized in the campaign are typically associated with women or men (Alexander and Anderson 1993; Dolan 2010; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Koch 1997; Rosenwasser and Dean 1989; Sanbonmatsu 2002).

It can be difficult to separate the effects of race and gender because women are doubly bound and have found themselves allying with white women and black men to achieve social progress (hooks 1981). Tate (1993) notes that it is difficult to find elections in which the race and gender of candidates vary, competing candidates are viable, and the candidates are ideologically similar to each other and their voters. Nevertheless, the studies that do exist suggestion some evidence of intersectionality—specifically, that black women are more likely to support black women candidates (Clayton and Stallings 2000; Philpot and Walton 2007).

THE DC CASE

The 2014 mayoral primary election in Washington DC is useful to explore the effects of multiple identities in both political attitudes and vote choice. The first advantage is the campaign offered the right variation of issues. There was a good balance of issues that threatened gender identity, race identity, none, or both. This balance of issues provides a unique environment within which to test the hypotheses.

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The second advantage is that this election featured is a unique pair of candidates. Although there were many candidates on the ballot, by the close of the primary election, voters essentially had two choices: the incumbent Mayor Vincent Gray and the challenger Muriel Bowser. Both candidates are black, are from the same party, and have a similar ideological orientation, but are of different genders. Previous U.S. elections have featured two black candidates, even black candidates of both genders, but rarely are these candidates ideologically similar with reasonable chances of victory. Historically, when there have been elections with intriguing combinations of race and gender, the candidates are typically from different parties.

To study the issues in the election, I collected and coded all *Washington Post* articles about the election. In all, I identified 107 different articles starting approximately two weeks prior to the Mayor announcing his reelection bid on January 8, 2014, through Election Day on April 1, 2014. I coded each article for major issues discussed, including corruption, city services, gentrification, crime, education, marijuana, race, economy, affordable housing, and campaign news.

Marijuana

At the beginning of the election cycle, the city government was considering a proposal to legalize recreational marijuana. The bill would decriminalize the possession of small amounts of marijuana but would retain sanctions for sale and distribution. Media reports suggested marijuana decriminalization had widespread support in DC, including in the black community. While black residents of DC are only 13.1% more likely to use marijuana than whites, 90% of arrests for marijuana possession were black males. (Government of the District of Columbia 2016; Davis 2014b). Blacks were also 67% more

likely than whites to be arrested for marijuana while in predominately white neighborhoods (Fielding-Miller et al. 2017).

Both Gray and Muriel Bowser supported decriminalization. Decriminalization would have the immediate effect of reducing the disparities in marijuana arrests. That fact seems to be a major consideration for black men, who generally support decriminalization. It was also a consideration for black women, who would be especially concerned about the impact of this disparity on families.

TABLE 1: Percent of Newspaper Articles Concerning Issues Surrounding Decriminalization of Marijuana

Adverse Effect on Youth	50%
Racial Disparities in Arrests	25%
Conflicting Jurisdictions	25%
Crackdown on Dealers	25%
Less Harmful than Alcohol or Cigarettes	17%

Table 1 shows how decriminalization was presented in the media. Most of the discussion in newspapers focused on potential dangers of decriminalization. Half of the articles discussed the adverse effects of decriminalization on youth. These articles discuss concerns over increased access to a drug, commonly thought to be a gateway drug, and the potential effects on the brain for underage users. A further 25 percent of articles discussed the dangers associated with the multiple jurisdictions in Washington, DC. DC has a number of law enforcement agencies active in the area, with large swaths of land controlled by the federal government, even within the city limits. These include public parks such as the National Mall. But these facilities may also include Section 8 housing and smaller parks throughout the city. Conflicting jurisdictions pose a risk of an unsuspecting user of being arrested on federally controlled land, despite being within the city limits (Davis 2014a). Unsuspecting users caught in federal lands would be subject to lengthy prison sentences.

Other articles discussed the potential benefits of decriminalization. Decriminalization would immediately alleviate racial disparity in marijuana-related arrests and would free up law enforcement resources to potentially go after more dangerous drug dealers. Other articles noted that marijuana use in adults is believed to be less harmful than cigarette smoking.

Other Campaign Issues

Other issues were also salient at different points in the election. These issues show that intersectional effects are only present in the marijuana threat condition. Table 2 shows the percentage of articles that mentioned an issue through the whole campaign. In January and February, the most covered issues in the campaign were affordable housing/ gentrification, decriminalization, and the campaign updates. After the first week of March, the content of media materials changed markedly, with a dramatic uptick of articles on corruption. The corruption issue would dominate until Election Day.

TABLE 2: Percent of Articles Mentioning an Issue in the Primary by Month

	January	February	March
Affordable Housing / Gentrification	36%	45%	36%
Campaign	32%	30%	31%
Corruption	14%	10%	43%
Education	18%	10%	7%
Race	18%	10%	36%
Poverty / Economy	4%	15%	14%
Marijuana	4%	10%	10%

Gentrification was a major issue in the campaign. DC has experienced significant gentrification since 2008, with an influx of largely white residents into previously black-dominated areas of the city. Gentrification has negatively impacted these poorer, black areas

of the district by increasing living costs, which, in turn, drove the homelessness rate up by 135% between 2013 – 2014 (Dvorak 2014). Because of this, the city has taken steps to improve the affordability of housing. This includes increasing the availability of rent-controlled housing and keeping property taxes relatively constant. Other initiatives provide district support for first-time home buyers, loan subsidies for lower-income households, and subsidies for heating and cooling. These steps have slowed the black exodus from the district, but problems associated with predominately black areas of the district remain, including poverty, unemployment, and crime.

For this reason, Gray sought to assure voters he was improving economic conditions. Gray's stance reflected a desire to maximize business growth while keeping poorer, long-time residents in their homes. One example was financing the construction of stadiums in poorer areas—articles about which are included Table 2's tally of gentrification coverage. The mayoral campaign also included discussion of the construction of a stadium in Southwest DC for the DC United soccer team. There is significant opposition to the stadium. A number of articles included the view that that the city should invest instead in education or affordable housing (O'Connell 2014; DeBonis and Clement 2014). Muriel Bowser opposed the construction of the new stadium unless funds were set aside for education and affordable housing.

Education was also an issue during the election, although it featured less controversy than in the 2010 mayoral primary. In 2010 the then-Chancellor of DC Schools, Michelle Rhee, had embarked on a campaign to improve schools using tactics that were perceived as too harsh, such as the firing of under-performing principals and teachers and the closing of underperforming schools. After his election, Mayor Gray replaced Ms. Rhee with a far less controversial appointment, Kaya Henderson. Henderson's name was infrequently mentioned

in the press, and the controversy of the Rhee era was abated. At the time of the campaign, DC schools had been improving, and Henderson enjoyed the support of the city council, including Bowser.

The final salient issue in the campaign was the federal investigation into the Gray's previous campaign. The Washington Post first reported the investigation in October 2011, but breaks in the case became public right before the primary election. During that time, there were stories about campaign staffers' salaries coming from non-campaign funds and a plea bargain where Gray's alleged co-conspirator, Jeffrey Thompson, pled guilty to conspiracy and shared alleged details of the Mayor's involvement in open court. Gray and his allies responded by trying to rally traditional bases of support. In March, Mayor Gray received the endorsement of former Mayor Marion Barry—himself a convicted felon. The two frequently campaigned together. Media outlets reported the use of race-coded speeches in various venues, including phrases such as "east of the river," "one of us," and "faith community."

Hypotheses

I test for evidence of intersectionality in both respondents' political attitudes and vote choice. I hypothesize that two conditions—threat and immediacy—must be present for race and gender identities to interact. These conditions should only exist for marijuana legalization. Compton et al. (2004) reports that nationally, marijuana use was already higher among black men (6.9% report using it) compared to white men (5.7%), white women (2.6%), and black women (3.0%). Media reports largely focused on the dangers to families, and these concerns should be most salient to black women because so many are heads of households (Conover 1988; Kaufmann 2006). In D.C., 41% of households in DC are headed by women, with 82% of black families are headed by a single parent. Approximately 70% of

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households are headed by women in predominately black neighborhoods (Annie E. Casey Foundation 2017). As a result, black women should be more opposed to legalization compared to both black men and white women.

With regard to gentrification, I expect attitudes to be more negative among blacks than whites because of its disparate negative impact on blacks. There is not, however, a clear reason to expect black men and black women to differ. Moreover, the issue of gentrification was not connected to a specific and immediate threat during the campaign.

With regard to the DC United stadium in particular, the framing in news coverage—i.e., the diversion of funds from other priorities such as education or affordable housing—leads me to expect women to oppose the stadium more than men. This reflects the greater priority placed on education by women. Moreover, the construction of the stadium was imminent at that point it time, satisfying the immediacy condition. However, the media coverage did not clearly signal a threat to the interests of blacks. Thus I do not expect a racial difference in opinion, or any difference between black men and black women.

With regard to Kaya Henderson, the fact that her tenure was less controversial made issues related to DC public schools less salient. There was no immediate threat present that was tied to racial or gender identities. Thus, I do not expect race or gender to affect opinions of her.

Finally, with regard to the mayoral candidates, I expect, first, that whites are more supportive of Bowser than Gray. In part, this is due to Gray's explicit attempts to court African-American voters. I would not expect black men and women to differ in their view of the Gray scandal, however, as it did not engage gender identity.

Second, in terms of their vote intentions, I expect black men to be more supportive of Gray because of his enthusiastic support for marijuana decriminalization. I also expect

black women more supportive of Bowser because of her hesitation with endorsing marijuana decriminalization. With the election imminent, the issue of voting clearly met the immediacy condition.

DATA AND METHODS

The data for this study are two Washington Post DC polls. The first poll ran January 9-12, 2014, with 1,003 respondents. The second poll ran March 20-23, 2014, with 1,402 respondents. The January poll was a general survey of respondents' political attitudes and early vote choices while the March poll concentrated on respondents' vote choices in the upcoming election. I estimated multivariate models with indicators for black men, white men, black women, and white women. White men serve as the baseline. I compare the relevant coefficients to gauge whether black women differ from black men and white women. If these coefficients differ at a statistically significant level, then I conclude that there is evidence of intersectional effects. These models do not include any other factors—such as income, education, ideology, etc.—as these factors are themselves arguably affected by race and gender. Including them would thus create post-treatment bias (Rosenbaum 1984; King 2010; Gerber and Green 2012; Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen 2016). To minimize this risk, controls are excluded from these models.

The dependent variables include attitudes toward gentrification, affordable housing, stadium construction, and decriminalization of marijuana. For gentrification, higher values indicate that gentrification is a good thing. For affordable housing, higher values indicate that the district is doing a good job creating affordable housing. For stadium construction and decriminalization of marijuana, higher values indicate support for a policy proposal. In terms of the mayoral rates, I examine people's views of the Gray investigation, where higher

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values indicate that people considered it more important. Finally, I examine vote intention

(1-Gray and 0-Bowser or other candidates).

TABLE 3: Descriptive Statistics of Washington Post 2014 polls.

	White Men	White Women	Black Men	Black Women
Affordable housing				
Excellent	15%	25%	35%	23%
Good	58%	54%	36%	49%
Not so good	23%	20%	27%	23%
Poor	3%	1%	2%	5%
Gentrification				
Good thing	86%	76%	49%	50%
Neither good nor bad	3%	11%	3%	6%
Bad thing	10%	13%	48%	45%
Legal Marijuana				
Favor	72%	70%	62%	47%
Oppose	28%	30%	37%	52%
DC United Stadium				
Strongly Favor	16%	8%	20%	12%
Somewhat Favor	22%	22%	22%	17%
Somewhat Oppose	23%	34%	17%	19%
Strongly Oppose	39%	36%	41%	52%
Kaya Henderson				
Strongly Approve	25%	16%	25%	25%
Somewhat Approve	44%	57%	43%	44%
Somewhat Disapprove	18%	19%	20%	16%
Strongly Disapprove	14%	7%	12%	15%
Gray scandal (Jan.)				
Major factor	68%	65%	30%	36%
Minor factor	21%	27%	34%	33%
Not a factor	11%	7%	36%	31%
Gray scandal (March)				
Major factor	74%	72%	33%	35%
Minor factor	18%	21%	23%	26%
Not a factor	8%	7%	44%	40%
Vote choice (Jan.)				
Gray	6%	7%	30%	33%
Bowser	10%	13%	14%	15%
Evans	22%	14%	8%	11%
Wells	20%	18%	5%	3%
Orange	1%	0%	12%	9%
Other	13%	10%	10%	4%
Undecided	28%	38%	20%	25%
Vote choice (March)				
Gray	9%	8%	50%	36%
Bowser	38%	41%	23%	30%
Evans	11%	13%	4%	4%
Wells	24%	15%	2%	4%
Orange	1%	0%	3%	4%
Other	9%	8%	9%	7%
Undecided	8%	15%	10%	16%

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FINDINGS

The descriptive statistics in Table 3 produce several findings consistent with the hypotheses. First, there do not seem to be differences by race or gender in attitudes towards Henderson. Second gentrification creates a racial divide—with whites seeing it as positive and black residents perceiving it as a negative—but black men and women do not differ much. (However, they differ somewhat in their views of current affordable housing initiatives: 23% of black women think these initiatives are "excellent" whereas 35% of black men do.) Similarly, attitudes toward the Gray investigation differ along racial but not gender lines. Support for the soccer stadium varies along gender lines. Women are more likely to strongly or somewhat oppose stadium construction relative to their male counterparts, although the difference between white men and women is larger than black men and women. There is also strong evidence for intersectionality in views of marijuana legalization. Black women support this at a far lower rate than any other group. Finally, there are stark differences in vote choice. White men and women's support for Bowser surged by similar intervals between January and March. Black women's support of Gray remained constant while black men's support jumped 20%. By March, a larger percentage of black women than black men supported Bowser.

The regression models in Tables 4-5 confirm these patterns. Contrary to expectations, black women are less supportive of affordable housing relative to black men and white women (Table 4, model 1). In models 2, 4, and 5, black women are statistically distinct form white women but not from black men in their views of gentrification and the Gray scandal consistent with expectations. In model 3, black women's support for the DC United stadium is statistically distinct from black men but not white women, also consistent

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with expectations. Finally, in model 7, black women's support of decriminalizing marijuana is statistically distinct from both black men and white women.

TABLE 4: Models of Attitudes Towards Election Issues

	(1) Afford-able Housing	(2) Gentrifi-cation	(3) Stadium	(4) Gray scandal (January)	(5) Gray scandal (March)	(6) DC Schools Chancellor	(7) Marijuana
White Women	0.11	0.12	-0.15	0.11	0.18**	0.12	-0.04
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.04)
Black Men	0.12	-0.52***	0.04	-0.52***	-0.58***	0.10	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.04)
Black Women	-0.03	-0.56***	-.27***	-0.42***	-0.52***	0.08	0.19***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.04)
Constant	2.92***	2.51***	2.17***	2.47***	2.47***	2.71***	1.34***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)
Observations	898	951	940	660	643	735	952
R-squared	0.01	0.10	.01	0.10	0.14	0.00	0.03
Wald Tests							
BM / BW	3.62*	.18	8.42***	1.75	.44	.03	11.24***
BW / WW	3.04*	64.36***	1.25	36.12***	66.43***	.70	22.89***

Cell entries are least squares regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<01$.

Table 5 presents logit models of vote intention in January and March. Comparing the coefficients in both models suggests that Gray garnered additional support from black men between January and March but lost support among black women. In the January poll, black men and women were more likely to vote for Gray than white men and women. But black women were slightly more likely to support Gray than black men. This then changed in the March poll—although the differences between black men and black women were not

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statistically significant.

Why did black men moved toward Gray as the election approached, while black women did not? One explanation is that black men were more angered by the investigation into Gray's 2010 campaign. There is some evidence to suggest this was not the case. Table 6 shows the percentage of voters who felt the investigation was fair by the importance they gave to the investigation. Voters who felt the investigation was fair were more likely to rank the importance very highly. Black women and men did not differ much, however.

TABLE 5: Models of Vote Choice

	(1) January 2014	(2) March 2014
White Women	-0.41	-0.38
	(0.43)	(0.38)
Black Men	1.40***	1.51***
	(0.29)	(0.28)
Black Women	1.61***	1.18***
	(0.27)	(0.26)
Constant	-2.75***	2.29***
	(0.23)	(0.22)
Observations	1,003	863
Wald Tests		
BM/BW	0.84	2.32
BW/WW	26.91***	21.02***

Cell entries are logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is coded 1-Gray and 0-Bowser or other. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Another explanation involves descriptive representation: perhaps black men are more likely to prefer a male leader, relative to black women. A final explanation involves marijuana legalization. Gray had supported this effort and shepherded it through the city

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council. Although Bowser voted for the bill, it was more clearly identified with Gray. Perhaps black men supported Gray more than did black women because they more strongly supported decriminalization. Unfortunately, neither of these hypotheses can be tested in the data available from the Washington Post. Bowser was no a prominent candidate at the time of the January poll that asked about support for decriminalization. Bowser was prominent by the March survey, but that poll did not ask about decriminalization.

TABLE 6: Impact on Perceptions of Investigation Fairness on the Importance of the Investigation

	Fair Investigation	Unfair Investigation
Black Men		
Major Factor	48%	3%
Minor Factor	20%	30%
Not a Factor	32%	67%
Black Women		
Major Factor	42%	16%
Minor Factor	25%	27%
Not a Factor	30%	56%

DISCUSSION

This chapter contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this paper disputes the notion that black racial identification and feminism leads to more liberal policy preferences (Gay and Tate 1998). In Washington DC, black women were *more* conservative in their attitudes on the decriminalization of marijuana, and distinct from black men and white women. The politics of Washington, D.C. provides the context for this intersectional effect. D.C. is predominately liberal and Democratic, and liberalism (except for black women) is correlated with support for marijuana decriminalization (Pew 2015). In a more conservative place where opposition to marijuana is higher among whites, there may be

smaller differences between black and white women.

Second, this chapter highlights the importance of context in creating intersectional patterns. For example, the nature of media coverage helps determine whether racial and gender identities, as well as their interaction, will significantly affect attitudes. Particularly important is whether that coverage conveys a "treat" to that identity. Intersectional patterns are generally present when an issue threatens both identities simultaneously and when that threat is "immediate," i.e., it will be adjudicated in a short period of time.

Third, this paper adds to the very small literature on the intersection of race and gender in voting behavior (Philpot and Walton 2007). By exploiting a rare case where there were two black candidates running within a single party, I show that black men and women voted differently.

This analysis is limited, however, in its focus on blacks and whites as well as on a specific set of issues in one local election. Moreover, it is limited by its reliance on observational evidence of the role of threat and immediacy. A better test would create exogenous variation in threat and immediacy and examine other racial and ethnic groups and issues plausibly related to their interests. These are the tasks I take up in the following chapters.

Chapter 3: Intersectionality in Gentrification Attitudes

The previous chapter explores the effects of intersectionality with respect to marijuana decriminalization. The perceived threat from marijuana decriminalization appears to have been concentrated among black women. In this chapter, I seek to more carefully test different types of threats that might create differences by race and gender. In particular, I focus on attitudes towards the construction of the new DC United soccer stadium. Gentrification has distinct impacts on vulnerable populations. For blacks, gentrification frequently results in displacement because blacks have lower incomes than whites. For women, a general orientation towards families and communities means that the impact of families losing their homes and social networks deteriorating may influence women more than men. This means that black women will generally be less supportive than black men, white women, and white men. White women will generally be more supportive of gentrification than black women but less supportive than white men.

In the early to mid-1900s, Washington, DC was home to a diverse mix of residents although a legacy of institutional racism remained imprinted on the city. Strict housing segregation laws were finally repealed in 1965, but poor black residents remained trapped in the poverty cycle. When Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated in 1968, tensions boiled over. Riots gripped the city, leaving extensive devastation and "white flight." Hundreds of buildings were severely damaged in the riots. City planners decided to take extreme measures to reduce crime rates and to attract additional commercial investment. DC increased its police force, worked closely with law enforcement partners to improve their effectiveness, passed a very strict firearms law, and even quarantined sections of the city with particularly high violent crime rates. The city sought to increase commercial revenue and spur gentrification by building government buildings in poorer neighborhoods and by extending

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mass transportation into these neighborhoods. Perhaps the most prominent efforts to improve poorer neighborhoods involves the construction of massive sports complexes in the city proper. The Capital One Arena (formerly the MCI Center and the Verizon Center) was constructed in what was then the poor Chinatown neighborhood. Nationals Park was constructed in southwest DC. The DC government sought to do this again through the construction of the DC United Stadium.

The efforts of the DC government are classic examples of a city's promoting gentrification via housing codes, zoning laws, city councils, and community boards (Kirkland 2008). This has been largely successful in the District of Columbia, which has seen a decades-long rise in property values, less crime, and strong commercial development. Despite these promising metrics, gentrification does come at a cost for disadvantaged groups (Kirkland 2008). Homeowners have been forced out of their homes to make way for these new structures. Some were bought out while others were priced out by the increased costs of maintaining a home with higher property values. As a result, some residents have witnessed the erosion of long-standing cultural and community networks (Newman and Wyly 2006; Braconi 2004; Marcuse 1986).

The construction of the new DC soccer stadium was debated along exactly these lines. Critics argued that it would severely disrupt black family and community networks. The stadium replaced multiple blocks of housing for blacks and subsequent economic and commercial development may replace more black homes. This poses a threat for blacks living in D.C. The ongoing debate surrounding the stadium construction also provides a way to test differences in threat perception for immediate or distant construction proposals.

I will test three different hypotheses related to the types of threat DC residents experienced with the construction of the DC United Stadium. These hypotheses are based

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largely on the findings of the marijuana chapter, which suggested that the immediate threat made black women more opposed to DC's decriminalization initiative relative to black men and white women. I hypothesize:

1. Racial threat in the near future (immediate threat) will increase negative attitudes that black women have towards stadium construction, relative to black men and white women, due to the combination of the racial impact of gentrification along with the increased awareness women have of the negative impact of forced relocation on families and communities. Black women's attitudes will be statistically different relative to black men and white women.

2. **Hancock (2013) and Lindsay (2013) state that race and gender are inseparable in black women.** Following this assumption, immediate gender threat towards family and community posed by the displacement of cultural and community networks will increase negative attitudes towards stadium construction in black women without an explicit reference to race. White women are not likely to experience the same displacement of networks, and thus will be less affected by gender threat. I predict black women's attitudes to be statistically different from black men and white women.

3. Threat in the distant future (distant threat) will not increase negative attitudes in black women towards stadium construction, relative to black men and white women. For distant threat, black women's attitudes will not be significantly different from black men and white women.

METHOD

I use an experimental design to test whether threat to family and community or racial threat create intersectional attitudes towards the construction of DC United Stadium. I also

examine whether the impact of these two types of threat depends on whether the threat is depicted as immediate or more distant. Participants were randomly assigned to one of seven experimental conditions. Vignettes provided a summary of plans for stadium construction, local officials' support of the stadium, and expected construction dates. Vignettes included identical wording except for the threat primes. The racial threat prime discussed the anticipated disruption to social networks resulting from involuntary displacement in the black community specifically. The gender threat prime discussed disruption to social networks but without reference to a racial group. The term gentrification may be implicitly racialized because gentrification has typically involved richer whites moving in while poorer blacks (and other people of color) are forced out. However, these vignettes may nevertheless increase or decrease the racial threat posed by gentrification by discussing the anticipated consequences. Vignettes that explicate the consequences for the black community raise the threat for blacks in ways other discussions do not.

I also distinguished between immediate and distant threat primes. Immediate primes indicated that construction would begin this year. Distant primes indicated construction was to begin in 2020. Finally, a control vignette was also included that did not include any threat prime or reference to a timeframe. The exact wording of the vignettes and questionnaire is available in the Appendices A and B.

After reading the vignette, respondents were asked their levels of anger, fear, worry about the stadium construction, their support or opposition to the new stadium, and the likelihood that the stadium would have a negative impact on their community. The responses were averaged into a single index because they explore different aspects of the negative impact of gentrification. The alpha for this index is .86. Higher values indicate greater opposition or concern about the stadium.

I recruited a total of 549 DC residents, with 60 – 99 participants for each vignette between November 2015 – August 2017.[1] I targeted DC residents because they are the most likely to be impacted by the construction of the sports stadium. Participants were recruited via social media. Approximately 50% of participants were recruited via snowball recruitment on social media, such as Facebook, Twitter, Craigslist, and email. These respondents were mostly white. I then specifically targeted black DC residents using Facebook ads. The ads targeted residents who lived in predominately black or mixed-race ZIP codes in DC. Additionally, I also sought responses from residents whose interests on Facebook included predominately black neighborhoods, black churches, and historically black colleges and universities in DC. The descriptive statistics of the experimental sample are included in Appendix C.

RESULTS

To evaluate the impact of race and gender—and how that impact varies based on the experimental treatments—I estimate a series of models in which overall attitudes toward the scale are a function of race, gender, and their interaction (see Table 7).

In the control model, black women are more opposed to stadium construction than black men and white women. The difference between black women and black men is .09, while the difference between black women at white women is .11. Neither of these differences are statistically significant.

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[1] The sample is not evenly distributed across experimental vignettes due to an error in processing responses from the survey software. The software recorded uncompleted surveys as completed. In most of these cases, the respondents didn't move passed the vignette stage of the survey. The processing error was corrected about halfway through data collection for the remaining responses.

TABLE 7: Effect of Race and Gender on Opposition to Stadium Construction, by Experimental Condition

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Racial Gentrification Threat + Immediate	Racial Gentrification Threat + Distant	Gender/ Family and Racial Gentrification + Immediate	Gender/ Family and Racial Gentrification + Distant	Gender Threat + Immediate	Gender Threat + Distant	Control
White Women	0.00	-0.01	0.04	0.07	-0.04	-0.02	0.06
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.07)
Black Men	0.26**	0.14	0.19	0.32**	0.05	0.04	0.08
	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.10)
Black Women	0.24***	0.28***	0.17**	0.27***	0.15*	0.36***	0.17**
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.07)
Constant	0.25***	0.23***	0.31***	0.25***	0.25***	0.35***	0.24***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Observations	87	71	77	74	59	81	99
R-squared	0.16	0.18	0.07	0.15	0.07	0.20	0.06
Wald Tests							
BM / BW	.86	.24	.89	.72	.40	.02**	.42
BW / WW	.02**	.01***	.18	.05*	.08*	.00***	.19

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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When primed with a distant gender threat, black women and men react differently. Black women's opposition to the stadium increased by .19, compared to the control group, while black men's opposition decreased by .04. White women's opposition also decreased by .08. The differences between black women and both black men and white women are statistically significant. This is consistent with the second hypothesis which posits black women will be more responsive to gender threat than black men and white women.

When primed with an immediate gender threat, however, these patterns do not emerge. Black men's opposition decreases relative to the control by .03 while black women's opposition decreases by .02. There is no evidence that black men and women respond differently. White women's support decreases by .1, creating a slightly larger gap between black women and white women ($p=0.08$). Overall, distant threat has a more pronounced effect than immediate threat, contrary to the third hypothesis.

Next I examine the reaction to the combined race and gender threats. In the experimental condition in which this combined threat was distant, black women's opposition to the stadium increases by .10 and black men's opposition increases by .24, relative to the control. Opposition in white women increases by .1. Thus, this experimental treatment created a larger gap between black and white women ($p=.05$). But contrary to the expectations, black men have a similar, and possibly more pronounced response, to the combinations of racial and gender threat than black women.

When the combined racial and gender threat was immediate, there is no change in black women's opposition to stadium construction, relative to the control. Black men's opposition increases by .11 and white women's opposition decreases by .2. Taken together, these shifts did not create significant differences between black women and other groups. These are inconsistent with all the hypotheses. Black women were not responsive to the

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gender threat, and black men even shifted in the opposite direction as expected. And again, the effect of immediate threat is not as pronounced as distant threat.

Finally, when primed with a distant racial threat, black women's opposition to the stadium increases by .11 while black men's opposition increases by .06, relative to the control group. Opposition among white women decreases by .07. Under immediate racial threat, black men's opposition increases by .18 and black women's by .07, while white women's opposition decreases by .06. This creates the expected larger gap between black women and white women—one that is also statistically significant. Thus, both black men and women respond to racial threat, and black men are especially responsive to an immediate racial threat, consistent with the first hypothesis. These results among black men, although not black women, are also with the third hypothesis, which posits that immediate threat will be more potent than distant threat.

DISCUSSION

This chapter examines how different groups react to threat. In general, racial and gender threats, as well as their combination, increased opposition to stadium construction among black women—although there was no evidence that immediate threats mattered more than distant threats. Black men's opposition to stadium construction increased in response racial threats as well, although not to a purely gender threat. Notably, gender threat also had a different impact among white women, whose opposition to the stadium did not increase in response to this threat. This challenges the notion of gender threat as truly gender specific. It also suggests that on this issue, race and gender cannot be disaggregated (see Hancock 2013 and Lindsay 2013).

Contrary to expectations, immediate threats did not seem to be more potent than

distant threats—with the exception of immediate racial threat, which was more potent for black men than distant racial threat. The reasons for this are unclear.

Chapter 4: Intersectionality in Immigration Attitudes

A sizeable literature seeks to explain public attitudes towards immigration, but few if any studies have considered immigration attitudes through an intersectional lens. Existing literature has examine how attitudes about immigration are related to race and ethnicity, but less often gender and even more rarely the combination of race and gender. Immigration is an issue with both local and national relevance, compared to the primarily local issues discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. National issues, and particularly immigration (Tichenor 2002), are often chronically salient in politics, making voters' attitudes less malleable and more grounded in partisanship and other stable values (Chubb, Hagen, and Sniderman 1991). These factors may influence the patterns observed in Chapters 2 and 3. The contribution of this chapter is to identify whether race and gender intersect and produce distinctive patterns of support for immigration.

BACKGROUND

Previous studies of immigration attitudes tend to focus on one of two factors. The first is that economic considerations. In this vein, support for immigration decreases as perceived threat to voters' jobs increases and when voters believe immigration poses an undue cost to society (Kessler 2001; Mayda 2006; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Fennelly and Federico 2008; Hanson 2005). The second factor is prejudicial attitudes grounded in symbolic concerns about immigrants' identities and effect on national culture (e.g., Citrin, Green, Musk, and Wong 1997; Epenshade and Hempstead 1996; Hood and Morris 1997).

However, the correlates of immigration attitudes vary by race. Black attitudes appear to depend more on perceptions of racial power than economic threat or prejudice

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(Okongwu et al. 2013, Hutchings and Wong 2014). Latinos are widely assumed to be more supportive of liberal immigration policy, but that support does depend on group consciousness (Sanchez 2006), a preference for Spanish, and higher levels of cultural affinity (de la Garza 1998; Newton 2000). Hispanic attitudes towards immigration also appear to be influenced by white attitudes. When whites are more supportive of restrictive immigration measures, Hispanics become more opposed to these measures (Michelson 2001).

The impact of gender on attitudes toward immigration appears mixed (Burns and Gimpel 2000). To illustrate this, I compiled the results from 30 articles examining attitudes towards immigration (see Table 8).

TABLE 8: Effect of Gender in Immigration Articles

Significant	Burns and Gimpel 2000 (+); Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990 (-)
Marginally Significant	Espenshade and Calhoun 1993 (-)
Mixed	Ha 2010; Hajnal and Rivera 2014; Okongwu et al. 2013
Not Significant	Alverez and Butterfield 2000; Binder et al. 1997; Sanchez 2006; Citrin, Green, Muste, and Wong 1997; de la Garza 1991; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Fennelly and Federico 2008; Hood et al. 1997; Hood and Morris 1997; Hood and Morris 1998; Lu and Nicholson-Crotty 2010; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Sides and Citrin 2007; Mickelson 2001; Sanchez 2006
Not considered	Brader Valentino and Suhay 2008; Citrin and Sides 2008; de la Garza 1998; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015; Hutchings and Wong 2014; Sniderman et al. 2004; Valentino, Brader, and Jardina 2013; Wilson 2001

In 30% of articles, gender is not considered. Gender was significant or marginally significant in less than 10% of articles, and the direction of the effect was not consistent. Burns and Gimpell (2000) find that being female increases support for liberal immigration policies, while Citrin et al. (1990) and Espenshade and Calhoun (1993) find that being female decreases support for liberal immigration policy. Gender is not significant in 50% of articles.

Considering the effect of race and gender through an intersectional lens may thus provide more clarity. As in Chapter 2, I expect threat to create intersectional effects. Women are generally more concerned with issues of family and community, and immigration has a big impact on family and community life. Under low threat, I hypothesize that intersectional effects will not be present and that immigration attitudes will only differ by race. Thus, the attitudes of Hispanic women and white women will differ, but Hispanic men and Hispanic women will not. I expect intersectional effects to appear under high threat. Under high threat, the attitudes of Hispanic women, Hispanic men, and white women will all differ at statistically significant levels.

Immigration Threat

Immigration debates are common in American politics, but in 2010 the Hispanic community in Arizona faced a unique threat from the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act. This law was widely considered to be the harshest anti-immigrant law in the United States because it required state and local police officers in Arizona to inspect the identification documents of individuals who might be undocumented immigrants. This was a controversial change from previous policy which left immigration enforcement to the federal government. This bill increased scrutiny for those who appeared

to be of Hispanic descent, potentially subjecting them to increased police actions, more stringent background checks, and restrictions on their livelihoods.

DATA AND METHODS

The data for this paper come from multiple surveys. A May 2010 MSNBC-Telemundo poll was in the field when the Arizona bill was being considered. Additional data on Hispanics' reaction to the Arizona bill comes from a survey of Hispanics by the Pew Hispanic Center (963 respondents). I also draw on the 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, or CCES (47, 411 respondents), the 2012 CCES (51,501 respondents), and the 2014 CCES (45,454 respondents).

The different immigration questions in these surveys allow me to ascertain whether the level of threat creates intersectional effects. Policies that increase the risk of harassment of immigrants or make it more difficult to for immigrants to obtain jobs and essential services are considered to indicate high threat. In these surveys, these policies include: the 2010 Arizona immigration bill, the removal of birthright citizenship, allowing police to question those who may be here illegally, fining businesses that hire illegal immigrants, creation of a national identification card, denial of access to emergency rooms and public schools, and identifying and deporting illegal immigrants.

Policies that do not increase the risk of harassment or restrict access to services include providing in-state tuition for illegal migrants, creating two-year work visas, increasing the guest worker program, and providing a pathway to legal status. Under the criteria articulated above, building border fences and increasing the number of border patrol agents are considered low-threat. These policies do not directly increase the likelihood of

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harassment for Hispanic citizens. (The exact wording of all questions is available in Appendix A.)

Each of these dependent variables is modeled with binary indicators for combinations of race and gender: black men, black women, Hispanic men, Hispanic women, white men, and white women. In the Pew survey of Hispanics, I compare only Hispanic men and Hispanic women.

RESULTS

Table 9 reports the results from the Pew survey. Models 1-4 involve dependent variables considered to be high threat. Contrary to expectations, Hispanic women are not statistically distinct from Hispanic men in these models. But Hispanic women do have distinctive attitudes on two policies considered to be low-threat: in model 5, Hispanic women are more opposed to increasing the number of border patrol agents. In model 6, Hispanic women are more opposed to building border fences.

Table 10 reports results from the 2010 MSNBC/Telemundo poll. Models 1-3 involve dependent variables deemed high-threat. Although there are clear differences between the views of Hispanics and whites in these models, there is little evidence that Hispanic women differ from Hispanic men. In fact, Hispanic women differ from Hispanic men only on two policies deemed low-threat. Hispanic women are more opposed to building additional border fences relative to Hispanic men and white women. Hispanic women are also more supportive of allowing illegal immigrants to obtain work visas compared to Hispanic men and white women.

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TABLE 9: Support for Various Immigration Proposals (2010 Pew Survey of Hispanics)

	(1) Amend Constitution to Repeal Automatic Citizenship	(2) Require Police to Check Immigration Status	(3) Workplace Raids to Discourage Hiring Illegal Migrants	(4) Require Citizens to Carry a National ID Card	(5) Increase Number of Border Patrol Agents	(6) Build Additional Border Fences	(7) Provide In-State College Tuition for Illegal Immigrants	(8) Leave Immigration Enforcement to Federal Authorities	(9) Provide a Process for Migrants to Become Legal
Threat level	*High*	*High*	*High*	*High*	*Low*	*Low*	*Low*	*Low*	*Low*
Hispanic women	0.12	-0.04	-0.11	-0.16	-0.30***	-0.27**	0.06	-0.02	0.08
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.19)
Constant	-1.45***	-1.53***	-1.17***	0.45***	0.24***	-0.50***	1.58***	-1.67***	2.21***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.13)
Observations	1,315	1,307	1,291	1,327	1,293	1,296	1,300	1,267	1,304

Cell entries are logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

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TABLE 10: Support for Various Immigration Policies Using MSNBC/Telemundo 2010.

	(1) Fine Businesses Which Hire Illegal Immigrants	(2) Remove Birthright Citizenship (Logit)	(3) Support for Arizona Law Making Illegal Immigration a Crime	(4) Build More Border Fences	(5) Allow Illegal Immigrants to Obtain Visas	(6) Allow 2-year Visas when Employers can't Hire American	(7) Provide a Path to Citizenship for Illegal Immigrants
Threat Level	*High*	*High*	*High*	*Low*	*Low*	*Low*	*Low*
White Women	-0.14	0.46**	0.17	-0.12	0.04	-0.01	-0.06
	(0.09)	(0.18)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Hispanic Men	-0.61***	-1.15***	-0.83***	-0.38***	0.19	0.13	0.13
	(0.11)	(0.24)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Hispanic Women	-0.84***	-1.64***	-1.06***	-0.89***	0.44***	0.08	0.15
	(0.11)	(0.27)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Constant	3.31***	-0.09	2.87***	3.26***	2.78***	3.00***	2.85***
	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Observations	813	788	800	798	812	808	804
R-squared	0.08		0.14	0.07	0.02	0.00	0.01
Wald Tests							
HM/HW	3.06*	2.44	2.25	14.21***	3.40*	0.17	0.05
HM/WW	35.92***	57.16***	82.80***	39.75***	10.71***	0.64	3.10*

Cell entries are least squares or logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE 11: Support for Various Immigration Policies in the 2010 CCES

	(1) Fine Businesses	(2) Allow Police to Question Those who May be here Illegally	(3) Increase the Number Of Guest Workers	(4) Increase Border Patrols	(5) Grant Legal Status to Illegal Immigrants Who Meet Conditions	(6) None of the Above
Threat Level	*High*	*High*	*Low*	*Low*	*Low*	*Low*
White Women	-0.26**	-0.36***	-0.60***	-0.26***	0.35***	0.13***
	(0.11)	(0.02)	(0.11)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Black Men	-0.18	-1.38***	0.21	-0.65***	0.92***	0.39***
	(0.28)	(0.05)	(0.25)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)
Black Women	-1.06***	-1.64***	-0.88***	-0.85***	0.94***	0.57***
	(0.20)	(0.04)	(0.25)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Hispanic Men	-0.91***	-1.17***	0.45	-0.87***	0.96***	0.23**
	(0.29)	(0.05)	(0.29)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.09)
Hispanic Women	-1.41***	-1.77***	-0.39	-1.36***	1.44***	0.36***
	(0.28)	(0.06)	(0.32)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)
Constant	1.30***	0.27***	-0.69***	0.73***	-0.74***	-2.69***
	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Observations	2,263	55,400	2,263	55,400	55,400	55,400
Wald Tests						
HM/HW	1.63	63.25***	4.09**	56.99***	53.47***	1.31
BW/BM	7.03***	17.21***	10.12***	15.29***	.10	4.15**
HM/BM	3.45*	8.02***	.43	11.95***	.36	1.94
WW/HW	16.73***	627.50***	.44	555.23***	535.01***	8.62***
WW/BW	15.49***	983.12***	1.17	303.20***	297.21***	61.41***
HW/BW	1.15	4.22**	.2	87.48***	84.34***	5.62***

Cell entries are logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table 11 reports models of immigration attitudes from the 2010 CCES. Here again, there is not a clear relationship between the level of threat and whether race and gender interact. Two dependent variables capture policies considered to be high-threat. In one case—fining businesses that hire illegals relative to white women—Hispanic men and Hispanic women do not differ. But in the other case, Hispanic women are more opposed to allowing police to question those who may be here illegally, relative to Hispanic men as well as white women. But when threat is arguably lower (models 3-5), intersectional effects are present. In model 3, Hispanic women are more opposed to increasing guest workers relative to Hispanic men, but more supportive relative to white women. In model 4, Hispanic women are more opposed to increasing the number of border patrol agent relative to Hispanic men and white women. In model 5, Hispanic women are more supportive of conditionally granting legal status to illegal immigrants than are Hispanic men and white women.

TABLE 12: Support for Various Immigration Policies Using the 2012 CCES

	(1) Deny Citizenship to Dreamers	(2) Deny Illegal Immigrants Access to ERs & Schools	(3) Fine Businesses Which Hire Illegal Immigrants	(4) Allow Police to Question Anyone who May Be Here Illegally	(5) Increase the # of Border Patrol Agents	(6) Grant Legal Status When Certain Conditions Met
Threat Level	*High*	*High*	*High*	*High*	*Low*	*Low*
White Women	-0.38***	-0.25***	-0.33***	-0.33***	-0.28***	0.29***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Black Men	-1.58***	-1.27***	-0.88***	-1.40***	-0.69***	1.03***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Black Women	-1.69***	-1.37***	-1.23***	-1.64***	-0.82***	1.13***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Hispanic Men	-1.35***	-1.19***	-1.16***	-1.37***	-0.91***	1.10***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Hispanic Women	-1.57***	-1.31***	-1.62***	-1.72***	-1.24***	1.30***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Constant	-0.14***	-0.45***	0.92***	-0.02	0.55***	-0.48***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	54,535	54,535	54,535	54,535	54,535	54,535
Wald Tests						
HW/HM	6.52**	1.77	49.81***	18.79***	27.10***	9.10***
BW/BM	2.26	1.94	48.22***	13.13***	6.07**	3.56*
HM/BM	7.83***	.97	21.40***	.23	11.73***	1.39
WW/HW	394.51***	299.05***	756.45***	529.99***	429.25***	448.21***
WW/BW	794.44***	579.33***	693.00***	885.61***	225.91***	561.29***
BW/HW	2.85*	.83	51.14***	1.31	61.31***	10.05***

Cell entries are logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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TABLE 13: Support for Various Immigration Policies Using 2014 CCES

	(1) Allow Police to Question Anyone Who May be Here Illegally	(2) Fine Businesses Which Hire Illegal Immigrants	(3) Identify and Deport Illegal Immigrants	(4) Grant Legal Status to Illegal Immigrants with Conditions	(5) Increase Number of Border Patrols	(6) Do None Of These Actions
Threat Level	*High*	*High*	*High*	*Low*	*Low*	*Low*
White Women	-0.23***	-0.36***	-0.13***	0.19***	-0.21***	0.23***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Black Men	-1.02***	-0.74***	-0.74***	0.73***	-0.48***	0.76***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.09)
Black Women	-1.21***	-1.04***	-0.99***	0.78***	-0.59***	0.91***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.07)
Hispanic Men	-1.12***	-1.15***	-1.19***	1.01***	-0.74***	0.35***
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.12)
Hispanic Women	-1.41***	-1.66***	-1.50***	1.18***	-1.06***	0.85***
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.09)
Constant	-0.33***	0.79***	0.43***	-0.32***	0.47***	-3.42***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)
Observations	56,200	56,200	56,200	56,200	56,200	56,200
Wald Tests						
HW/HM	11.54***	55.59***	18.88***	6.11**	23.88***	12.39***
BW/BM	8.72***	35.32***	22.33***	1.03	4.86**	2.41
HM/BM	1.56	43.53***	47.88***	18.45***	17.72***	8.63***
WW/HW	349.18***	673.98***	690.48***	253.57***	318.98***	45.16***
WW/BW	550.68***	434.58***	631.29***	316.99***	133.11***	105.42***
BW/HW	7.68***	117.43***	76.44***	48.46***	75.01***	.39

Cell entries are logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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Table 12 reports the results from the 2012 CCES. For three of the four policies that are most threatening, the results are consistent with expectations. Relative to Hispanic men and white women, Hispanic women are more opposed to denying citizenship to children of illegal immigrants, more opposed to fining businesses that hire illegals, and more opposed to allowing police to question those who may be here illegally. But they are not more opposed than Hispanic men to denying illegal immigrants access to emergency rooms and schools relative to white women. Moreover, for the lower threat policy—increasing the number of border patrols—there is an intersectional pattern: Hispanic women are more opposed to increasing border patrols relative to white women and Hispanic men.

Finally, Table 13 reports the results from the 2014 CCES. There is again evidence that Hispanic women have distinctive attitudes under conditions of higher threat: they are more opposed to allowing police to question those who may be here illegally relative. fining businesses which hire illegal immigrants, and to identifying and deporting illegal immigrants (models 1-3). But intersectional effects are present under lower threat as well (models 4-5), as Hispanic women are more likely to support granting legal status and more opposed to increasing the number of border patrol agents.

DISCUSSION

In general, these results do not support the hypothesis that threat creates intersectional effects. Across surveys and dependent variables, the intersection of ethnicity and gender—especially when comparing Hispanic women and men—did not emerge more consistently for policies that arguably posed a more immediate and severe threat to Hispanic populations. At the same time, there is evidence for intersectionality more generally—especially in the CCES where the larger sample size provides more statistical power. In those surveys, Hispanic women are generally more supportive of liberal immigration policies

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relative to Hispanic men, consistent with Simien and Clawson (2004) and Gay and Tate (1998), who find that black women are more liberal than black men. Relative to Hispanic men, Hispanic women are more opposed to allowing police to question those who may be here illegally, fining businesses that hire illegal immigrants, and increasing the number of border patrols. White women are also more opposed to these proposals than white men— suggesting a gender effect in both ethnic groups, but white women nevertheless are less liberal than either Hispanic men or women.

In short, although racial attitudes are a major driver of immigration attitudes, its impact is modified somewhat by gender. This helps explain the conflicting significance of gender in prior studies. Women's attitudes are closely aligned with their race and ethnicity, but not necessarily identical to men of their same racial or ethnic group.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

I use the theory of intersectionality to demonstrate that race and gender can simultaneously affect political preferences. In three empirical chapters, I investigate whether and how threat affects the relative importance of race and gender, as well as their intersection.

In Chapter 2 I demonstrate how race and gender affected voters' preferences in the 2014 Washington DC Democratic primary election and their attitudes towards major election issues. This analysis showed in particular the distinctiveness of black women. They were more likely to support Muriel Bowser relative to black men. They were also the group most opposed to decriminalizing marijuana. This may have reflected their concern that decriminalization would lead to wider drug use and negatively affect their families and communities.

Chapter 3 explores how threat informs attitudes towards gentrification in Washington, DC. One project linked to gentrification was a new soccer stadium for the DC United team in southeast DC. Via an original experiment, I examined the role of threat on the impact of race and gender on support for the stadium. I found that distant threat changed attitudes more than immediate threat. I also found that framing the issue in terms of threats to family had a greater impact on women. Framing the project in terms of its threats to black families affected both black men and women but affected black men more. Finally, combining race and gender threats changed attitudes more than either threat individually, especially among black men.

In Chapter 4's study of immigration attitudes, however, I find that threat does not consistently generate an intersectional pattern: the policies that would most severely affect Hispanics did not necessarily generate differences in opinion between Hispanic men and

women. Instead, I found a broader intersectional pattern, with Hispanic women consistently more supportive of liberal immigration policies than Hispanic men, white women, and white men. Hispanic men, meanwhile, were less supportive of liberal immigration policies than Hispanic women but consistently more supportive than white women and white men.

There is thus much more research needed to understand how identities interact to affect political preferences. I focus on three key questions that may be fruitful. First, we need to better understand identity salience and understand how identities become relevant. One of the assumptions of intersectionality is that salience is fluid. Scholars need to be able to understand when a when identity salience changes because this this may affect how voters respond to an issue. For example, increased gender salience may alter the interaction of gender and race.

Second, research needs to move beyond race and gender to explore other identities that influence political attitudes, such as social class, rural consciousness, partisanship, and sexual orientation. For example, recent work such as Massey and Brodmann (2014) has shown that class plays a large role in shaping individual's perspectives. Thus, a blue-collar worker's views on the economy and education may differ from a white-collar worker even within the same racial or ethnic group. There may also be differences by gender within social classes. For example, women may be more concerned about how public policies impact their family and communities relative to men of the same class.

Third, it is important to identify other causal mechanisms that explain systematic differences between groups. My findings demonstrate that threat explains some intersectional effects but not all. Intersectional patterns exist in a mix of high and low threat situations. This suggests the need to identify additional mechanisms for creating intersectional effects.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Vignettes

Treatment Article 1: Racial threat only + Immediate Proposal

Washington, D.C., [date in near future] (Washington Post)

The debate over the construction of a new DC United soccer stadium in southeast DC is heating up as the city council and business leaders make plans to begin building this year.

Those who support the stadium highlight the benefits, including increased property in the area. The stadium is expected to speed up the gentrification of poorer neighborhoods, as new residents and tourists will be drawn to the stadium area. New businesses will open to serve the needs of residents and tourists alike.

Those who oppose the stadium highlight the disadvantages of this proposal. Opponents argue that the predominately black neighborhoods around the stadium will likely suffer the same fate of other black neighborhoods affected by gentrification. Many long-term black residents are expected to be displaced by the destruction of public housing, rising rents, increased property taxes, and the higher purchasing costs of upscale businesses. Opponents say those who remain will experience isolation as mostly white residents move in.

Washington mayor, Muriel Bowser, supports the stadium if affordable housing projects are included in the design plan. Business leaders are known to oppose the mayor's proposal, but are pushing a compromise proposal that will allow significantly fewer affordable housing units.

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Treatment Article 2: Racial threat only + Distant Proposal

Washington, D.C., [date in near future] (Washington Post)

The debate over the construction of a new DC United Soccer stadium in southeast DC is becoming more frequent as the city council and business leaders make plans to begin building in 2020.

Those who support the stadium highlight the benefits, including increased property in the area. The stadium is expected to speed up the gentrification of poorer neighborhoods, as new residents and tourists will be drawn to the stadium area. New businesses will open to serve the needs of residents and tourists alike.

Those who oppose the stadium highlight the disadvantages of this proposal. Opponents argue that the predominately black neighborhoods around the stadium will likely suffer the same fate of other black neighborhoods affected by gentrification. Many long-term black residents are expected to be displaced by the destruction of public housing, rising rents, increased property taxes, and the higher purchasing costs of upscale businesses. Opponents say those who remain will experience isolation as mostly white residents move in.

Washington mayor, Muriel Bowser, supports the stadium if affordable housing projects are included in the design plan. Business leaders are known to oppose the mayor's proposal, but are pushing a compromise proposal that will allow significantly fewer affordable housing units.

Treatment Article 3: Race and Gender Threats + Immediate Threat

Washington, D.C., [date in near future] (Washington Post)

The debate over the construction of a new DC United soccer stadium in southeast DC is heating up as the city council and business leaders make plans to begin building this year.

Those who support the stadium highlight the benefits, including increased property in the area. The stadium is expected to speed up the gentrification of poorer neighborhoods, as new residents and tourists will be drawn to the stadium area. New businesses will open to serve the needs of residents and tourists alike.

Those who oppose the stadium highlight the disadvantages of this proposal. Opponents argue that the predominately black neighborhoods around the stadium will likely suffer the same fate of other black neighborhoods affected by gentrification. Many long-term black residents are expected to be displaced by the destruction of public housing, rising rents, increased property taxes, and the higher purchasing costs of upscale businesses. Opponents say those who remain will experience isolation as mostly white residents move in.

Most concerning to those opposed to the stadium is the impact on families and children. Families may be evicted from their homes and may face challenges relocating, such as finding a new school for their children. Opponents also argue that families who must move will face the additional expenses associated with suburban life, such as increased transportation costs and longer commute times.

Washington mayor, Muriel Bowser, supports the stadium if affordable housing projects are included in the design plan. Business leaders are known to oppose the mayor's proposal, but are pushing a compromise proposal that will allow significantly fewer affordable housing units.

Treatment Article 4: Race and Gender Threats + Distant Proposal

Washington, D.C., [date in near future] (Washington Post)

The debate over the construction of a new DC United Soccer stadium in southeast DC is becoming more frequent as the city council and business leaders make plans to begin building in 2020.

Those who support the stadium highlight the benefits, including increased property in the area. The stadium is expected to speed up the gentrification of poorer neighborhoods, as new residents and tourists will be drawn to the stadium area. New businesses will open to serve the needs of residents and tourists alike.

Those who oppose the stadium highlight the disadvantages of this proposal. Opponents argue that the predominately black neighborhoods around the stadium will likely suffer the same fate of other black neighborhoods affected by gentrification. Many long-term black residents are expected to be displaced by the destruction of public housing, rising rents, increased property taxes, and the higher purchasing costs of upscale businesses. Opponents say those who remain will experience isolation as mostly white residents move in.

Most concerning to those opposed to the stadium is the impact on families and children. Families may be evicted from their homes and may face challenges relocating, such as finding a new school for their children. Opponents also argue that families who must move will face the additional expenses associated with suburban life, such as increased transportation costs and longer commute times.

Washington mayor, Muriel Bowser, supports the stadium if affordable housing projects are included in the design plan. Business leaders are known to oppose the mayor's proposal, but are pushing a compromise proposal that will allow significantly fewer affordable housing units.

Treatment Article 5: Gender Threats + Immediate Threat

Washington, D.C., [date in near future] (Washington Post)

The debate over the construction of a new DC United Soccer stadium in southeast DC is becoming more frequent as the city council and business leaders make plans to begin building this year.

Those who support the stadium highlight the benefits, including increased property in the area. The stadium is expected to speed up the gentrification of poorer neighborhoods, as new residents and tourists will be drawn to the stadium area. New businesses will open to serve the needs of residents and tourists alike.

Most concerning to those opposed to the stadium is the impact on families and children. Families may be evicted from their homes and may face challenges relocating, such as finding a new school for their children. Opponents also argue that families who must move will face the additional expenses associated with suburban life, such as increased transportation costs and longer commute times.

Washington mayor, Muriel Bowser, supports the stadium if affordable housing projects are included in the design plan. Business leaders are known to oppose the mayor's proposal, but are pushing a compromise proposal that will allow significantly fewer affordable housing units.

Treatment Article 6: Gender Threats + Distant Threat

Washington, D.C., [date in near future] (Washington Post)

The debate over the construction of a new DC United Soccer stadium in southeast DC is becoming more frequent as the city council and business leaders make plans to begin building in 2020.

Those who support the stadium highlight the benefits, including increased property in the area. The stadium is expected to speed up the gentrification of poorer neighborhoods, as new residents and tourists will be drawn to the stadium area. New businesses will open to serve the needs of residents and tourists alike.

Most concerning to those opposed to the stadium is the impact on families and children. Families may be evicted from their homes and may face challenges relocating, such as finding a new school for their children. Opponents also argue that families who must move will face the additional expenses associated with suburban life, such as increased transportation costs and longer commute times.

Washington mayor, Muriel Bowser, supports the stadium if affordable housing projects are included in the design plan. Business leaders are known to oppose the mayor's proposal, but are pushing a compromise proposal that will allow significantly fewer affordable housing units.

Treatment Article 7: Control

The debate over the construction of a new DC United soccer stadium in southeast DC is heating up as the city council and business leaders make plans to begin building.

Those who support the stadium highlight the benefits, including increased property in the area. The stadium is expected to speed up the gentrification of poorer neighborhoods, as new residents and tourists will be drawn to the stadium area. New businesses will open to serve the needs of residents and tourists alike.

Washington mayor, Muriel Bowser, supports the stadium if affordable housing projects are included in the design plan. Business leaders are known to oppose the mayor's proposal, but are pushing a compromise proposal that will allow significantly fewer affordable housing units.

Appendix B: Gentrification Survey: Question Wording and Original Coding

1.) Do you live in the DC Area? (1-Yes 2-No)
2.) What is your zip code? (Short answer)
3.) Directions: Please read the news article on the next page. You will be asked to answer a few questions after reading the article.
4.) Random Vignette
5.) Do you support or oppose the construction of the new soccer stadium?
(1-Strongly Support 2-Support 3-Oppose 4-Strongly Oppose)
6.) Do you support or oppose the proposal for the new soccer stadium?
(1-Strongly Support 2-Support 3-Oppose 4-Strongly Oppose)
7.) How anxious (that is, uneasy) does the soccer stadium make you feel?
(1-Very, 2-Somewhat, 3-A little, 4-Not at all)
8.) How proud does the soccer stadium make you feel?
(1-Very, 2-Somewhat, 3-A little, 4-Not at all)
9.) How angry does the soccer stadium make you feel?
(1-Very, 2-Somewhat, 3-A little, 4-Not at all)
10.) How hopeful does the soccer stadium make you feel?
(1-Very, 2-Somewhat, 3-A little, 4-Not at all)
11.) How worried does the soccer stadium make you feel?
(1-Very, 2-Somewhat, 3-A little, 4-Not at all)
12.) How excited does the soccer stadium make you feel?
(1-Very, 2-Somewhat, 3-A little, 4-Not at all)
13.) How likely is it that the proposed soccer stadium will have a negative impact in your community?
(1-Extremely, 2-Somewhat likely, 3-Neither likely nor unlikely, 4-Somewhat unlikely, 5-Extremely Unlikely)
14.) How likely is it that the proposed soccer stadium will improve the prospects for your community?
(1-Extremely, 2-Somewhat likely, 3-Neither likely nor unlikely, 4-Somewhat unlikely, 5-Extremely Unlikely)
15.) What is your race/ethnicity? (Select all that apply.)
(1-White, 2-Black or African American, 3-American Indian or Alaskan Native, 4-Asian, 5-Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, 6-Other)
16.) Are you of Spanish or Hispanic Origin?
(1-Yes, 2-No)
17.) What is your age?
(1-Under 18, 2-18-24, 3-25-34, 4-35-44, 5-45-54, 6-55-64, 7-65-74, 8-75-84, 9-85 or older)
18.) What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received?
(1-Less than high school, 2-High school graduate, 3-Some college, 4-2 year college, 5-4 year college, 6-Professional degree, 5-Doctorate)

19.) Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a Democrat, Independent, Republican, or other?
(1-Democrat, 2-Independent, 3-Republican, 4-Other)

20.) On most political matters, would you say you are
(1-Extremely Liberal, 2-Liberal, 3-Slightly Liberal, 4-Moderate; middle of the road, 5-Slightly Conservative, 6-Extremely Conservative, 7-Don't Know.)

21.) What is your gender?
(1-Male, 2-Female)

22.) Which of the following best describes your household income?
(1-Less than $10,000, 2-$10,000 - $19,999, 3-$20,000 – $29,999, 4-$30,000 – $39,999, 5-$40,000 – $49,999, 6-$50,000 – $59,999, 7-$60,000 – $69,999, 8-$70,000 – $79,999, 9-$80,000 – $89,999, 10-$90,000 – $99,999, 11-$100,000 – $149,999, 12-More than $150,000.

APPENDIX C: Sample Statistics: Percentage of Participants by Race and Gender

Vignette	Black	White	Other	Male	Female	White Men	White Women	Black Men	Black Women	N
1 (Gentrification + Immediate Threat)	43%	49%	8%	46%	55%	34%	15%	11%	30%	87
2 (Gentrification + Distant Threat)	46%	39%	14%	44%	61%	25%	14%	11%	35%	71
3 (Family & Gentrification + Immediate)	38%	48%	14%	38%	65%	26%	22%	9%	29%	77
4 (Family & Gentrification + Distant)	32%	57%	11%	45%	62%	31%	24%	7%	26%	74
5 (Family Threat + Immediate)	40%	47%	13%	53%	48%	32%	15%	12%	28%	60
6 (Family Threat + Distant)	31%	47%	22%	44%	59%	26%	21%	9%	22%	81
7 (Control)	34%	59%	7%	47%	53%	34%	24%	9%	23%	99

Note: In some cases, male and female do not add up to 100 because several participants declined to identify their gender.

APPENDIX D: Immigration Attitudes Question Wording

CCES 2010
- Fine businesses
- Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxe for the past 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes.
- Increase the number of guest workers allowed to come legally to the U.S.
- Increase the number of border patrols on the U.S. – Mexican border.
- Allow police to question anyone they think may be in the country illegally.
- None of the above.

CCES 2012
- Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes. 0 – Yes, 1 – No
- Increase the number of border patrols in the US-Mexican border. 0 – Yes, 1 – No
- Allow police to question anyone they think may be in the country illegally. 0 – Yes, 1 – No
- Fine US businesses that hire illegal immigrants. 0 – Yes, 1 – No
- Prohibit illegal immigrants from using emergency hospital care and public schools. 0 – Yes, 1 – No
- Deny automatic citizenship to American-born children of illegal immigrants. 0 – Yes, 1 – No

CCES 2014
- Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of felony crimes. 0 – Yes, 1 – No
- Increase the number of border patrols on the US-Mexican border. 0 – Yes, 1 – No
- Allow police to question anyone they think may be in the country illegally. 0 – Yes, 1 – No
- Fine US businesses that hire illegal immigrants. 0 – Yes, 1 – No
- Identify and deport illegal immigrants. 0 – Yes, 1 – No
- None of these. 0 – Yes, 1 – No

MSNBC/Telemundo 2010
- Increasing border security by building a fence along part of the U.S. border with Mexico and by hiring and training more border patrol agents. 1 – strongly favor, 2 – somewhat favor, 3 somewhat oppose, 4 – strongly oppose
- Allowing undocumented immigrants who are already in the country to receive a work visa if they pay a fine of around five thousand dollars, pay back taxes, and pass a criminal background check. 1 – strongly oppose, 2 – somewhat oppose, 3 – somewhat favor, 4 - strongly favor.
- Immigrants who want to come to the U.S. to work and who are not already here could apply for a two-year work visa which will be granted if an employer shows they

cannot fill the job with a legal U.S. resident. 1 – strongly oppose, 2- somewhat oppose, 3-somewhat favor, 4-strongly favor.

- Allowing undocumented migrants who are already in the country to pay a fine, learn Engish, and go to the back of the line of the opportunity to become American citizens. 1 – strongly oppose, 2- somewhat oppose, 3-somewhat favor, 4- strongly favor

- Imposing new fines on businesses that hire illegal immigrants. 1 – strongly favor, 2 – somewhat favor, 3-somewhat oppose, 4, strongly oppose.

Pew 2010

- Would you favor changing the Constitution so that the parents must be legal residents of the U.S. in order for their newborn child to be a citizen, or should the Constitution be left as it is? 1-Favor changing Constitution, 2-Leave Constitution as is, 8- Don't know, 9-Refused

- Should local police take an active role in identifying undocumented or illegal immigrants, OR should enforcement be left mainly to the federal authorities? 1-Police take active role, 2-Enforcement left to federal authorities, 8-Don't know, 9-Refused

- Workplace raids (IF NECESSARY: Workplace raids to discourage employers from hiring undocumented or illegal immigrants). 1-Approve, 2-Disapprove, 8-Don't know, 9-Refused

- Building more fences on the nation's borders. 1-Approve, 2-Disapprove, 8-Don't know, 9-Refused

- Increasing the number of border patrol agents. 1-Approve, 2-Disapprove, 8-Don't know, 9-Refused

- A requirement that all U.S. residents carry a national identity card. 1-Approve, 2-Disapprove, 8-Don't know, 9-Refused

- Should an illegal immigrant who graduated from a high school in your state and is accepted to a state public college qualify for the in-state college tuition rate, or shouldn't they? 1-Should qualify, 2-Should not qualify, 8-Don't know, 9-Refused.

- Should local police take an active role in identifying undocumented or illegal immigrants, OR should enforcement be left mainly to the federal authorities? 1-Police take active role, 2-Enforcement left to federal authorities, 8-Don't know, 9-Refused.

- Thinking about immigrants who are living in the U.S. (United States) illegally... do you favor or oppose providing a way for illegal immigrants currently in the country to gain legal citizenship if they pass background checks, pay fines and have jobs? 1-Favor, 2-Oppose, 8-Don't know, 9-Refused.